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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
DENNIS A. HEAPS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 192 54 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant; Dennis A. Heaps, was charged with Possession 
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1978). 
Defendant was on parole from the Utah State Prison for the crime 
of burglary. 
Defendant waived the jury and was convicted of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person in a 
trial held April 25, 1983, in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest 
F. Baldwin, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced on May 4, 
1983, by Judge Baldwin, to serve an indeterminate term of 1 to 
15 years in the Utah State Prison, to run concurrently with the 
term already being served by defendant for the prior burglary 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of Sunday, January 23, 1983, Brian 
Hargett cleaned his .380 automatic pistol and replaced the gun 
and its holster between the mattress and bed frame at the foot of 
his waterbed in his bedroom CR. 63-64, 781. The bed covers were 
pulled away, exposing the handle of the gun CR. 781. 
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on January 23, 1983, 
defendant, Doug Jensen and Gabe Gallegos visited Hargett's 
apartment to watch videos CR. 64-66, 72, 153-155, 165-166>. 
Defendant had met Hargett only a day or two earlier at a small 
party in defendant's apartment just down the hall from Hargett's 
CR. 69-70, 93, 153, 189-1901. During the course of their visit, 
each of the three visitors used Hargett's bathroom, going through 
Hargett's bedroom to get there CR. 66-67, 73-74). Defendant and 
the other two visitors left Hargett's apartment at approximately 
12:30 a.m. CR. 67, 74, 166). The following Wednesday, after 
learning that defendant had been arrested for possession of a 
firearm, Hargett looked for his gun between the mattress and bed 
frame and discovered that the gun was missing CR. 67-68, 75-77). 
Hargett testified that to his knowledge no one knew he kept a gun 
in his bedroom CR. 70-71, 79). 
On the evening of Tuesday, January, 25, 1983, at 
approximately 9:00 o'clock, defendant asked his friend David 
McCoy to drive him and his girlfriend, LaDawn Turner, to his 
girlfriend's house by way of North Temple CR. 82, 159, 201-202). 
Defendant, Turner, McCoy and McCoy's 3-year-old daughter were in 
the cab of McCoy's 1979 Ford pickup truck driving along North 
Temple when defendant pulled a gun from his waistline and showed 
it to McCoy CR. 84-85, 94, 1991. McCoy asked defendant to put 
the gun back, and defendant did so CR. 85). 
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At defendant's request, McCoy pulled into the parking 
Jut of Grinders 13, a restaurant located between 1100 and 1200 
,,;psi: on North Temple CR. 83, 93, 160, 201). Defendant exited the 
ui•kup truck and, while the others waited in the cab, walked next 
~uor to the Lake Hills Community Correction Center, a halfway 
liuuse for convicts, ostensibly to pick up from his friend Mike 
Periy a magazine and a pair of sunglasses that defendant had left 
at the halfway house when he had been released therefrom in 
December of 1982 CR. 85, 93, 128, 159-160, 174-175). Defendant 
returned to McCoy's pickup truck, followed by Perry, and both got 
into the cab CR. 85, 94, 130, 160, 173). McCoy was sitting 
behind the steering wheel with his daughter seated immediately to 
his right, while on the other side of the gearshift sat Turner, 
dclendant and Perry, in that order IR. 86, 96-97). 
After Perry got in the cab of the pickup truck, McCoy 
drove out of the Grinders 13 parking lot, angling west across 
North Temple CR. 85, 94, 108, 115, 131-132, 160-161, 172-173). 
McCoy pulled into the VIP Trailer Court and came to a stop when 
Officer Henry Huish of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
pulled in behind the pickup truck with his patrol car's overhead 
rack lights flashing CR. 86, 94, 108, 115, 133, 162, 181). 
Officer Huish had been observing the pickup truck and its 
occupants for several minutes from his parked patrol car after 
having noticed the pickup truck during two passes of the Grinders 
13 parking lot, and decided to stop the pickup truck when McCoy 
illegally changed lanes while angling across North Temple CR. 
106-10 8 , 115) • 
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As backup units arrived, Officer Huish ordered the 
occupants out of the cab of the pickup truck. Dave McCoy, his 
daughter, LaDawn Turner, defendant and Mike Perry, in that order, 
then existed the pickup truck from the driver's side CR. 86, 95-
96, 109, 121, 134-135). The officers then searched the occupants 
for firearms, and Officer Huish searched the pickup truck cab, 
finding the loaded .380 automatic under the seat approximately 12 
to 18 inches away from the passenger door, directly below where 
defendant had been sitting CR. 96, 109-11, 114-115, 121). 
Concerned because of the discovery of the gun, the officers, for 
their own safety, handcuffed but did not place under arrest the 
occupants of the pickup truck CR. 117-120). 
Office Huish interviewed each of the occupants 
separately regarding possession of the gun, and each initially 
denied any knowledge of the gun; however, upon a second interview 
both McCoy and Perry informed Officer Huish that defendant had 
been in possession of the gun, keeping it tucked in his waistband 
CR. 95-98, 112-114, 116-118, 181-187). Defendant was placed 
under arrest and questioned again regarding possession of the 
gun. Defendant again denied any knowledge of the gun, but then 
asked if it was a .380 automatic. Officer Huish responded 
affirmatively, and defendant volunteered that the gun belonged to 
someone named Brian, who had probably left it in the truck CR. 
114, 162-163, 173). 
Because defendant at that time was on parole from the 
Utah State Prison for a previous burglary conviction CR. 53-54, 
151-152), he was charged with Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by 
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a Restricted Person. Defendant now appeals his conviction on 
that charge. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I. Defendant cannot raise for the first time on 
3 ppeal a claim that excluded testimony should have been admitted 
at trial under the prior inconsistent statement exception to the 
hearsay rule because defendant failed to so inform the trial 
court. This Court will not review claims in such circumstances 
because the trial court was not afforded the opportunity of 
addressing defendant's concerns, failure to raise the claim at 
trial indicates acquiesence in the trial court's ruling, and the 
granting of a new trial in such circumstances would contravene 
considerations of finality. 
Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its 
discretion by excluding hearsay testimony proposed by defendant 
or that he was unfairly prejudiced thereby. The trial court 
properly excluded the hearsay testimony because the testimony was 
no so inherently reliable that it could be admitted under an 
exception to the hearsay rule and because defendant did not 
provide the hearsay declarant an opportunity to deny or explain 
the alleged statement. Finally, in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of defendant's guilt, any error in the exclusion of the 
testimony was harmless. 
Point II. Defendant waived any challenge to the 
admissibility of the gun by failing to make a pre-trial motion to 
suppress such evidence in accordance with Rule 12, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and his interposing an objection at trial at 
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the end of the State's case-in-chief does not preserve the issue 
for appeal. Defendant has shown no cause warranting relief from 
Rule 12's waiver provision, and the waiver should be enforced 
because defendant long before the first day of trial was aware of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest and of the 
possibility of the introduction into evidence of the gun. 
Because defendant failed to discharge his burden of 
proof with respect to the alleged inadmissibility of the gun, the 
record does not reveal the extent of the police officer's 
probable cause for the stop, search and arrest; therefore, this 
Court has no basis upon which to review defendant's allegation of 
irregularities in the stop, search or arrest. Defendant should 
not be permitted to challenge on appeal issues he failed to 
develop adequately at trial. 
Finally, under Rakas y, Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 
s.ct. 421, 58 L.Ed. 2d 387 (1978), defendant has no standing to 
challenge the search of the passenger compartment of David 
McCoy's pickup truck because as a mere passenger he had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy therein. 
Point III. Defendant's conviction is supported by 
sufficient evidence. The testimony of David McCoy and Officer 
Henry Huish, the police report and other circumstantial evidence 
all established that the gun was in defendant's possession. 
MGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S WITNESS. 
-6-
A. DEFENDANT CANNOT CHALLENGE ON APPEAL THE 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
Defendant at trial sought to elicit from defense 
witness, Mike Perry, on direct examination the substance of a 
ctatement allegedly made by David McCoy at the VIP Trailer Court 
:J·"t after they had been released. The trial court sustained the 
prosecutor's objections to this hearsay testimony because the 
testimony was intended only to establish the truth or falsity of 
McCoy's alleged statement (R. 103, 140-146) [~Appendix "A"l. 
Defendant did not object to the trial court's ruling. 
Defendant on appeal alleges as error the trial court's 
exclusion of Perry's testimony and now claims for the first time 
that the testimony should have been allowed as a prior 
inconsistent statement, an exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 
63(1) (al, Utah Rules of Evidence (1977). (The new Utah Rules of 
Evidence did not become effective until September 1, 1983, after 
defendant's trial was completed.) Defendant in his brief 
speculates that in the absence of the trial court's rulings Perry 
would have impeached McCoy by testifying that McCoy told him that 
the gun was not in defendant's possession but was in fact in 
McCoy's possession (Brief of Appellant, p. 7). 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, provided that a party 
may challenge on appeal the exclusion of evidence only if the 
record shows that the party made known the substance of the 
evidence or indicated the substance of the anticipated evidence 
by questions indicating the desired testimony. In the instant 
case the substance of the excluded testimony was adequately 
indicated by the questions asked; however, this Court in 
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Bradford y. Alvey & Soos, Utah, 621 P.2d 1240 (1980), expanded 
the requirements of Rule 5 by affirming the trial court's 
exclusion of hearsay testimony on the grounds that at trial the 
plaintiff-appellant "did not make any offer of proof as to what 
evidence would be adduced, nor the purpose it would serve, as 
required by Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence." .l.d. at 1243 
(emphasis added). 
Io the case at bar, the trial court repeatedly asked 
defendant the purpose of the desired testimony and indicated that 
the testimony would be admissible if the reason for the questions 
was other than to establish the truth or falsity of McCoy's 
alleged statement (R. 141-142) [£e.e. Appendix "A"l. Defendant 
never advised the trial court that he was offering the testimony 
as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach McCoy. For 
defendant now to challenge the trial court's ruling on that basis 
violates the well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that absent 
exceptional circumstances a party cannot raise an issue for the 
first time on appeal. State y. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252 
(1983); Wagner y. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971). 
Since defendant has not alleged any exceptional circumstances 
justifying his failure to take advantage of the ample 
opportunities presented at trial to raise this claim, he is 
precluded from challenging the trial court's ruling. 
This Court's language in Bradford, indicating that a 
party cannot challenge on appeal the trial court's exclusion of 
testimony unless that party informed the trial court of the 
purpose to be served by the testimony, is supported by Rule 20, 
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utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-20 
(1982)), which provides: 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that 
a party state his objections to the actions 
of the court and the reasons therefore. 
If a party has no opportunity to object to 
a ruling or order, the absence of an 
objection shall not therefore prejudice him. 
Thus, although Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, did not expressly 
require a contemporaneous objection to a trial court's ruling 
excluding testimony as did Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1977), 
in cases involving the admission of evidence, under Rule 20, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's ruling in Bradford, 
a party has a duty at trial to raise the legal grounds supporting 
the admissibility of excluded testimony and to inform the court 
of the purpose to be served by the excluded testimony. 
The application of Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to this case is clear. Because defendant had ample 
opportunity to object to the trial court's exclusion of Mike 
Perry's hearsay testimony on the grounds that the testimony was 
admissible as a prior inconsistent statement offered for the 
purpose of impeaching David McCoy, defendant's failure to do so 
precludes him from now raising the issue on appeal. 
This result is supported by solid policy 
considerations. The court in Rice y. State, 567 P.2d 525 <okl. 
Cr. 1977), outlined several important reasons for such a rule. 
In .Ri..c..e, the prosecutor objected to testimony which the defendant 
sought to elicit on direct examination from her own witnesses. 
The .Ri..c..e court stated: 
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The court, rightfully or wrongfully, 
sustained the State's motion. 
Defendant thereupon took no exception 
to the court's ruling. An exception 
here would have been no mere formality 
for by not taking it defendant 
apparently acquiesced in the court's 
ruling. Had an exception been taken 
argument could have been had with the 
chance of changing the court's mind. 
Since the exception was not taken, 
the trial court was denied an 
opportunity to correct itself. 
A prosecutor's objection to evidence 
introduced by the defendant does not 
preserve the record for defendant when 
the court rules adversely to defendant • 
.I..d. at 530. 1 
These considerations are similar to those supporting 
the contemporaneous objection rule applied to cases in which the 
admission of evidence is challenged on appeal. This Court 
recently in State y. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982), 
endorsed the following statement of the Kansas Supreme Court in 
State y. Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 P.2d 923, 927 11975): 
The contemporaneous objection rule long 
adhered to in this state requires timely 
and specific objection to admission of 
evidence in order for the question of 
admissibility to be considered on appeal. 
The rule is a statutory procedural tool 
serving a legitimate state purpose. By 
making use of the rule, counsel gives the 
trial court the opportunity to conduct the 
trial without using the tainted evidence, 
and thus avoid possible reversal and a 
1 Under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a party woulld 
object rather than take exception to a trial court's ruling. In 
light of Rule 20's objection requirement, the elimination of any 
requirement to except to a trial court's rulings is obviously 
intended to eliminate superfluous exceptions when a timely and 
specific objection has already been interposed and~not to relieve 
a party of the duty to raise his or her concerns for the trial 
court's consideration. 
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new trial. Furthermore, the rule is 
practically one of necessity if litigation 
is ever to be brought to an end. 
fu;_Gardell, 652 P.2d at 947. After noting that defendant 
Mccardell failed to make a specific objection to the admission of 
the challenged evidence, this Court further stated: 
Id. 
This is clearly a case where a timely and 
specific objection would have afforded 
the trial court the opportunity to 
address McCardell's concerns and at the 
same time permit the State to proceed 
with the evidence most relevant to its 
case. A new trial should not be the 
result of McCardell's failure to provide 
the trial court that opportunity. 
The considerations outlined by the ~ court and this 
Court in Mccardell apply to the instant case. By failing to 
raise this claim at trial, defendant apparently acquiesced in the 
trial court's exclusion of the testimony. The prosecutor's 
objection should not preserve the issue for defendant because the 
prosecutor's position is at odds with defendant's position and 
the prosecutor's objection did not provide the trial court with 
the opportunity to address defendant's concerns. Defendant's 
failure to provide the trial court with such an opportunity 
should not result in a new trial at the expense of finality 
considerations and the conservation of already extended judicial 
resources. Also, the opportunity to conduct a trial using all 
admissible evidence is just as important as the opportunity to 
conduct a trial without using tainted evidence. Finally, all of 
these considerations are in harmony with the previously cited 
rule that a party cannot raise an issue for the first time on 
appeal. 
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Therefore, in compliance with Rule 20, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and this Court's ruling in Bradford y, AlveJ' 
~. Utah, 621 P.2d 1240 (1980), defendant is precluded from 
now challenging the exclusion of Mike Perry's hearsay testimony 
because he neither objected to the trial court's ruling stating 
the grounds therefor nor informed the trial court of any 
permissible purpose of the excluded testimony. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY EXCLUDIN:i THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY 
This Court has consistently held that the trial court's 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed 
unless there is a clear showing that the judge abused his 
discretion and that a party has been unfairly prejudiced. .ln 
Interest of s---J---, Utah, 576 P.2d 1280 (1978): In re Baxter's 
~. 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 442 (1965): ~ .al.s.Q State y. 
Carlson, Utah, 635 P.2d 72 (1982) ("clear showing" requirement). 
Moreover, when, as here, the trial is to the court, 
review of the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence is less strict because the trial judge has superior 
knowledge as to the competency and effect that should be given 
evidence and will include this knowledge and judgment in his 
consideration of the admissibility of the evidence. Del Porto y. 
~. 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972l: In re Baxter's 
~' 399 P.2d at 445, 
Defendant has made no clear showing that the trial 
court abused its discretion by excluding Mike Perry's hearsay 
testimony or that defendant was unfairly prejudiced thereby. 
Since, as discussed above, defendant failed to inform the trial 
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since, as discussed above, defendant failed to inform the trial 
court that the purpose of the excluded testimony was to impeach 
navid McCoy by means of a prior inconsistent statement the trial 
,_,,ur t' s failure to admit the testimony on this basis cannot be an 
"buse of discretion. Also, defendant was not unfairly prejudiced 
bj' the exclusion of the testimony because, as discussed below, 
any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt. 
C. THE TESTIJIDNY WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER AN 
EXCEPI'ION TO THE HEARSAY RULE BECAUSE IT 
LACKED THE INDICIA OF RELIABILITY. 
Hearsay testimony generally is excluded because the 
credibility of testimony is best tested when the witness 
testifies under oath in open court and is subject to cross-
examination. State y. Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 
11972); People y, Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983); McCormick on 
Evidence, § 245 (2d ed. 1972). 
However, testimony that is otherwise hearsay may be 
admitted into evidence if it falls under an exception having 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and absent such 
guarantees, the testimony is inadmissible. State y. Martin, 686 
P.2d 937, 949 (N.M. 1984); State y. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 
P.2d 404 (1980); People y. Howard, 198 Colo. 317, 599 P.2d 899 
11979); tl.a_ Rule 803 ( 24), Utah Rules of Evidence (Supp. 1983) 
(Hearsay statements are covered by this "catchall" exception only 
if they have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" 
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equivalent to those of the other exceptions.) .2 The Robinson 
court stated unequivocally: "Guarantees of reliability are and 
must be the key to open the door to the exceptions." 616 P.2d at 
411. The court in .limi.ALd equally emphatically stated: "The 
trier of fact will only be permitted to receive hearsay testimony 
as evidence only in those limited circumstances where the 
inherent reliability of the hearsay clearly outweighs the stro~ 
policy reasons for excluding it." 599 P.2d at 899. The 
exceptions dealt with in both Robinson and ~were, as here, 
established statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
In the instant case, Mike Perry's hearsay testimony 
could not have been admitted under an exception to the hearsay 
rule because it lacked the indicia of reliability. The court in 
Stanberry y. State, 637 P.2d 892 COkl. Cr. 1981), outlined 
several factors to be considered in determining the reliability 
of a hearsay statement: 
The trustworthiness of a statement should be 
analyzed by evaluating the facts corroborating 
the veracity of the statement, the circumstances 
in which the declarant made the statement, and 
the incentive he or she had to speak truthfully 
or falsely; and careful consideration should 
be given to factors bearing on the reliability 
of the reporting of the hearsay by the witness. 
2 The new Utah Rules of Evidence, though not in effect at the 
time of defendant's trial, reflect this Court's acknowledgement 
of the fact that exceptions to the hearsay rule depend on 
circumstantial guarantees of reliability that substitute for the 
oath and cross-examination. Although under the new rules a prior 
inconsistent statement is not hearsay, under the prior rules 
governing this proceeding, such a statement was admissible only 
a~ an exception to the hearsay rule and as such must have 
circumstantial guarantees of reliability. 
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_Ll. at 895, citing United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd 
cir. 1978). Although the Stanberry court considered the 
,elidbility of a hearsay statement in the context of the residual 
•xception to the hearsay rule, its test is equally applicable to 
the present situation. 
The defendant's questions of Mike Perry were clearly 
intended to elicit from Mike Perry testimony regarding an alleged 
statement by David McCoy to the effect that the gun was not in 
defendant's possession. The alleged statement fails the first 
test of reliability as set out by the Stanberry court: the 
alleged statement's veracity is not corroborated by other 
evidence. In fact, as noted below in the harmless error 
discussion, all of the evidence contradicts the substance of the 
alleged statement. The alleged statement also fails the 
Stanberry court's last test because the reliability of Mike 
Perry's reporting of the alleged statement was eroded by Officer 
Huish's testimony that Perry had informed him at the scene of the 
arrest that the gun was in defendant's possession and that he, 
Officer Huish, had so recorded the incident in his official 
report (R. 117, 181-187) ,3 
Finally, the hearsay testimony need not have been 
admitted merely because the alleged declarant was available for 
cross-examination. Beavers y. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971). 
The Beavers court reasoned: 
3 The other Stanberry tests apply to cases in which the 
trustworthiness of the declarant is suspect and so do not apply 
to the case at bar. 
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~. at 96. 
if the person to whom the statement 
is attributed is indeed present at the 
hearing and can testify, that person 
himself should testify to the facts 
contained in the statement which the 
first witness would have attributed 
to him. If he does, there is nothing 
lost to the party who sought to introduce 
that testimony as hearsay. However, if 
he does not, or will not, then an 
unproductive swearing contest, in which 
witnesses are attributing statements to 
each other, is avoided. 
McCormick, in support of the admissibility of 
inconsistent statements of a witness, noted: "It is hard to 
escape the view that evidence of a previous inconsistent 
statement, when declarant is on the stand to explain it if he 
can, has in high degree the safeguards of examined testimony." 
McCormick on Evidence, § 251 (2d ed. 1972). In the present case, 
although David McCoy was on the stand, defendant never questioned 
McCoy regarding the alleged statement during his initial cross-
examination of McCoy in the prosecution's case-in-chief or during 
his re-cross-examination of McCoy when McCoy was recalled as a 
rebuttal witness. Thus, defendant failed to provide McCoy an 
opportunity to deny, admit or explain the alleged statement, 
thereby eliminating the increased safeguards noted by McCormick. 
Therefore, defendant's belated claim that Perry's 
testimony should have been admitted under the prior inconsistent 
statement exception to the hearsay rule is without merit because 
the testimony lacked the indicia of reliability, and the fact 
that McCoy was available to testify does not increase the 
reliability of the hearsay testimony because defendant gave McCoy 
no opportunity to explain the alleged statement. 
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D. ANY ERROR IN THE EXCLUSION OF THE HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, provided that the 
exclusion of evidence shall not result in a reversal of a 
, 011v ict ion unless the proponent of the evidence makes an adequate 
offer of proof and the reviewing court determines that "the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence 
in bringing about a different verdict or finding." Rule 61, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides: 
No error in either the admission or 
the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting 
a new trial or otherwise disturbing 
a judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
This Court in State y. Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 
11980), further stated: 
The mandate of our statute, and 
the policy firmly established in our 
decisional law, is that we do not upset 
the verdict of a jury merely because 
some error or irregularity may have 
occurred, but will do so only if it 
is something substantial and prejudicial 
in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there 
would have been a different result. 
(Emphasis added.) Because of the overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt and because Mike Perry's credibility was 
impeached by Officer Huish's testimony, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the admission of Perry's hearsay testimony would 
have resulted in defendant's acquittal. 
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All of the evidence pointed to the fact that the gun 
was in defendant's possession. Officer Huish testified, and the 
police report confirmed, that both David McCoy and Mike Perry 
informed him that defendant was in possession of the gun CR. 117-
118, 181-187). David McCoy also testified that the gun was in 
defendant's possession (R. 84-88, 94-98, 198-200). Of those 
present in the cab of McCoy's pickup truck on the night of 
Tuesday, January 25, 1983, only defendant had been in Brian 
Hargett's bedroom between the time Hargett had cleaned and 
replaced the gun between the mattress and footboard of his bed on 
Sunday afternoon, January 23, 1983, and the time Hargett 
discovered that the gun was missing on Wednesday, January 26, 
1983 (R. 63-68, 72-77, 80, 85-86, 129-130, 191, 194). Finally, 
Officer Huish found the gun under the seat directly below where 
defendant had been sitting, 12" to 18" from the passenger door 
CR. 86, 96-97, 109-111, 121, 134-135). Thus, even if Perry's 
hearsay testimony had been allowed and had damaged the 
credibility of McCoy's testimony, the remaining evidence was more 
than sufficient to warrant the trial court's finding defendant 
guilty. 
However, because Officer Huish impeached Perry's 
credibility, there is no reasonable likelihood that the trial 
court would have believed Perry's testimony at the expense of 
McCoy's testimony. At trial, Perry denied having told the 
officer that the gun was in defendant's possession (R. 149-150), 
but Officer Huish testified that Perry had told him that 
defendant was in possession of the gun and the police report 
recorded that fact (R. 117, 181-187). 
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Therefore, any error in the trial court's exclusion of 
the hearsay testimony was harmless, and the conviction should be 
. {f 1 rmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE GUN 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
A. DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE 
ADMISSION OF THE GUN INTO EVIDENCE BY 
FAILING TO FILE A PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS. 
Rule 12 (bl, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, (Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-12) <1982)), provides: 
Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of the evidence, which 
is capable of determination without the 
trial of the general issue may be raised 
prior to trial by written motion. 
The following shall be raised at least 
five days prior to the trial: 
(2) Motions concerning the 
admissibility of evidence. 
!Emphasis added.) Subsection Cdl of Rule 12 further provides: 
Failure of the defendant to timely 
raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial 
or at the time set by the court .sh.all 
constitute waiver thereof, but the court 
for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
!Emphasis added.) 
Defendant failed to make a pre-trial motion to suppress 
the gun found by Officer Huish in his search of David McCoy's 
pickup truck on the evening of Tuesday, January 25, 1983. 
Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant's failure to so object to 
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the gun before trial constituted a waiver of his objection. 
Furthermore, defendant has not sought relief from such waiver and 
has shown no cause warranting this Court's granting of such 
relief. Indeed, defendant could not show sufficient cause to 
warrant the granting of relief. Defendant knew that the gun had 
been seized and the circumstances surrounding that seizure and 
had ample opportunity before trial to voice any objection to the 
admissibility of the gun in accordance with the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
This Court recently in State y. John, Utah, 667 P.2d 32 
(1983), held that under Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the defendant's failure to timely object to the 
victim's identification constituted a waiver of the objection. 
The Court stated: "It is held generally that where there is a 
claim of irregularity in obtaining evidence, such claim should be 
asserted before trial, or at the least, at the trial at the first 
opportunity.• .l_d. at 33. The Court supported this rule by 
quoting from Nardone y. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 
266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), to the effect that auxiliary inquiries 
should not be allowed to disrupt the course of the trial. 
In the instant case, defendant neither asserted his 
challenge to the constitutionality of the search that resulted in 
the seizure of the gun before trial not asserted such claim at 
the first opportunity at trial. Defendant waited until the 
prosecution finished its case-in-chief to object in conclusory 
terms to the admission of the gun. By that time, Brian Hargett 
had identified the gun as his and had testified that after 
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defendant had been in his bedroom he discovered the gun missing; 
oavid McCoy had identified the gun as the one defendant had in 
his possession while riding in the cab of McCoy's pickup truck on 
the evening of January 25, 1983; and Officer Huish had already 
1dentif ied the gun as the one he found under the seat in the cab 
c.l McCoy's pickup truck directly below where defendant had been 
sitting. This cannot constitute the raising of the claim at the 
first opportunity at trial since it contravenes the purpose of 
requiring early objection to alleged irregularities in the 
obtaining of evidence as outlined in Nardone; to wit, defendants 
must raise timely challenges to obtaining of evidence in order to 
avoid the disruption of the course of the trial. 
Although the defendant in J.Qhn also failed to interpose 
a timely objection as required by the "contemporaneous objection" 
rule, that ground for the Court's ruling was separate and 
independent from the Rule 12(d) waiver ground. The Rule 12(d) 
waiver provision alone is sufficient to warrant this Court's 
refusal to review an allegation of error on appeal. ~ State y. 
J:!.il.lil, Utah, 674 P.2d 130 (1983) (Rule 12(d) waiver alone 
precluded review of allegation of error regarding trial court's 
failure to inquire of the jurors if they would be prejudiced 
because the case involved motorcycle clubs). 
Other courts have also ruled under similar statutory 
schemes that the defendant's failure to make a pre-trial motion 
to suppress waives the issue even if the defendant subsequently 
OhJects at trial to the admission of the evidence. The Montana 
Supreme Court has stated the rule as follows: 
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One wishing to preclude the use of evidence 
obtained through a violation of his 
constitutional rights must protect himself 
by timely action. If he has had opportunity 
to suppress the evidence before trial and 
has failed to take advantage of his remedy, 
objection to the evidence upon trial will 
not avail him. 
State y. Briner, 567 P.2d 35, 37-38 (Mont. 1977), quoting .s..tat..e. 
y. Gotta, 71 Mont. 288, 290, 229 P. 405, 406 (1924). The Montana 
Supreme Court in D.I.i..ne.I held that the defendant's failure to file 
a pre-trial motion to suppress was not excused by good cause 
because the defendant, like the defendant in the instant case, 
was aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest 
and the possibility of the introduction of certain evidence long 
before the first day of trial. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in State y. Marahrnes, 114 
Ariz. 304, 560 P.2d 1211 (1977) (En Banc), refused to reach the 
merits of the defendant's challenge to the admissibility of 
certain evidence because the defendant had waived the issue by 
failing to make a pre-trial motion to suppress even though the 
defendant raised the objection at trial and his co-defendant 
filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the same evidence. 
Therefore, in compliance with the provisions of Rule 
12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's rulings in 
.J..Qhn and .M.ilJ...e.r, defendant's failure to challenge the 
admissibility of the gun in a pre-trial motion to suppress waives 
the objection, precluding the Court's reaching the merits of 
defendant's allegation of error on appeal, despite defendant's 
objection at trial. 
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B. DEFENDANT FAILED TO DISCHARGE HIS BURDEN 
OF PROOF REGARDING THE ALLEGED INADMISSIBILITY 
OF THE GUN. 
Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-12 (1982), provides that in a motion to suppress 
~vidence upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the 
defendant or applicant has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a substantial violation has 
occurred. Once the defendant or applicant has established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the search and seizure was 
unlawful, only then does the peace officer have the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was acting in 
good faith. 
12 (g) : 
This Court's rulings are to the same effect as Rule 
Evidence is suppressed or excluded only if 
the same was obtained by a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, designed to protect a 
person's right to privacy and property. 
Evidence sought to be excluded is 
admissible, however, until the accused 
has established that his rights under 
the rule have been invaded. 
State y. Sessions, Utah, 583 P.2d 44 (1978), quoting State y, 
Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958, ~. ~. 385 U.S. 
939, 87 s.ct. 305, 17 L.Ed. 2d 218 (1966) <emphasis added). 
The burden is properly on the defendant or applicant 
because the burden should be on the moving party, there is a 
presumption of regula.rity attending the actions of law 
enforcement officials, relevant evidence is generally admissible 
and exceptions must be justified by the party claiming the 
exception, and this burden will deter spurious allegations that 
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are wasteful of court time. Lafave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 11.2 
(1978), and cases cited therein. 
Defendant did not discharge his burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the gun was obtained by a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. To the contrary, defendant at trial was in effect 
"sandbagging," waiting to challenge on appeal issues he failed to 
develop fully at trial. As noted above, defendant failed to file 
a pre-trial motion to suppress the gun, in which defendant could 
have raised facts, if any, tending to establish that the search 
and seizure was unlawful and that a a substantial violation had 
occurred. 
Moreover, defendant also failed to pursue obvious lines 
of questioning that would have elicited more information 
regarding the existence or lack of probable cause on the part of 
Officer Huish with respect to the stop, the search or the arrest. 
For example, during defendant's cross-examination of Officer 
Huish, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. The reason you pulled the vehicle over 
was because of the improper lane change or 
the pulling out of the driveway without a 
signal on? 
A. That was one reason. 
(R. 115). Defendant failed to follow up Officer Huish's response 
with a question asking what other reasons he had for stopping 
McCoy's pickup truck. As a result, the record does not reveal 
what more probable cause existed for the stop, search or arrest, 
other than the above and David McCoy's speculation that Officer 
Huish had received a "tip" that there was a gun in the truck (R. 
98). 
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Because under Utah law defendant has the burden of 
establishing a substantial violation in a search and seizure 
case, defendant's failure to develop a record upon which the 
court could review the propriety of the search and seizure should 
preclude his present claim, and in the absence of any evidence 
that the search and seizure was unlawful and constituted a 
substantial violation, the Court should presume that the trial 
court properly admitted the evidence resulting therefrom. 
C. DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEARCH OF McCOY'S VEHICLE. 
It is well settled that a defendant has no standing to 
challenge the admissibility of evidence on the grounds of 
unlawful search and seizure if he claims prejudice only through 
the use of evidence gathered as a result of a search or seizure 
directed at another person; rather, the defendant must have been 
the victim of a search or seizure. Jones y, United States, 362 
u.s. 257, 80 s.ct. 725, 4 L.Ed. 2d 697 <1960). In other words, 
the fundamental inquiry regarding standing is whether the conduct 
challenged by the defendant involved an intrusion into his 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Mancusi y. DeForte, 392 U.S. 
364, 88 s.ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1154 Cl968l. 
The United States Supreme Court in Rakas y. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 99 s.ct. 421, 58 L.Ed. 2d 387, .J.:.eh. ~. 439 
u.s. 1122, 99 s.ct. 1035, 59 L.Ed. 2d 83 <1978), held that 
passengers are without standing to object to the search of the 
vehicle in which they are riding because they have no legitimate 
expectation of privacy therein. 
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In E.£.11..a.s., a police officer stopped what he believed was 
a getaway car after receiving a radio report of a robbery. After 
the occupants were ordered out of the car, a search of the 
interior revealed a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger 
seat and a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment. The 
defendants admitted they owned neither the vehicle nor the rifle 
and shells and that they were simply passengers in the vehicle. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined 
that the defendants had no "legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which 
they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an automobile, 
these are areas in which a passenger ~ passenger simply would 
not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy." .I.d. at 
148-149. 
In the instant case, defendant also owned neither the 
vehicle in which he was merely a passenger nor the gun discovered 
under the seat directly below where he was sitting. Therefore, 
defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the area 
under the seat and thus cannot challenge the search of McCoy's 
pickup truck. 
Defendant seeks to distinguish E.£.11..a.s. by claiming that 
the search was incident to an illegal arrest, a circumstance in 
which he claims E.£.11..a.s. dictum preserves defendant's standing. 
However, defendant does not cite to that portion of ~ that 
allegedly supports his contention. Furthermore, even if such 
dictum exists, it is merely dictum and is not binding on this 
Court. Finally, as previously discussed, as a result of 
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defendant's failure to discharge his burden of proof, the record 
does not reveal whether the initial detention was supported by 
arlequate probable cause. Therefore, defendant fails in his 
aLlempt to distinguish .E.'1..k..a..s. and thus under the terms of Ra.k..a..s 
nas no standing to challenge the search of McCoy's pickup truck. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
This Court has recently determined that the following 
standard should be applied on challenges to the sufficiency of 
evidence in jury trials: 
This Court definitively laid down the 
standard of review on challenges to the 
sufficiency of evidence in State v. Petree, 
Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983), in stating at 
333: [Wle review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict of the jury. We reverse a 
jury conviction for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. 
State y, Griffin, Utah, 685 P.2d 546, 547 (1984). This standard 
should apply with equal force to non-jury trials because when, as 
here, the trial court is the finder of fact, it has the 
prerogative to determine the substantiality of the evidence. 
State y, Romero, Utah, 684 P.2d 643 (1984). Defendant in his 
brief acknowledges that the above is the appropriate standard of 
review (Brief of Appellant, pp. 25-26). 
Defendant was charged under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-
501 ( 2), which provides in pertinent part: "Any person who is on 
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parole for a felony or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison 
shall not have in his possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part." Defendant does 
not challenge his status as a felony parolee, nor does he claim 
that the gun found under the seat in the passenger compartment of 
McCoy's pickup truck is not a dangerous weapon. Defendant claims 
only that the evidence did not support a finding that the gun was 
in defendant's possession or under defendant's custody or 
control. 
Contrary to defendant's contentions, defendant's 
possession of the gun was established by more than just David 
McCoy's testimony. Officer Huish testified, and the police 
report confirmed, that both David McCoy and Mike Perry informed 
him that defendant was in possession of the gun CR. 117-118, 181-
187). Of those present in the cab of McCoy's pickup truck on the 
night of Tuesday, January 25, 1983, only defendant had had the 
opportunity to steal Brian Hargett's gun after Hargett had 
cleaned the gun on the afternoon of Sunday, January 23, 1983, CR. 
63-68, 72-77, 80, 85-86, 129-130, 191, 194). Finally, Officer 
Huish found the gun under the seat directly below where defendant 
had been sitting CR. 86, 96-97, 109-111, 121, 134-135). 
Thus, the evidence was not so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. To the contrary, the 
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was 
in defendant's possession. Furthermore, because the conviction 
is supported by more than McCoy's eyewitness testimony, the cases 
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cited by defendant in his brief on this point are inopposite. 
finally, the trial court had ample opportunity to assess the 
c,edibility of the witnesses and whether their testimony was 
tainted by any self-interest, so the conviction should not be 
dist11rbed because of an allegation on appeal of tainted 
testimony. Therefore, the conviction should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State seeks aff irmance 
of the conviction below.-;£ 
DATED this ,,2_f____ day of January, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~~ 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Lisa J. Rema!, attorney 
for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 South 
Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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APPENDIX A 
A true and exact copy of pages 103, 140-146 of the 
Record on Appeal (Transcript page numbers 90-97), covering the 
portions of the trial transcript involving the exclusion of Mike 
Perry's hearsay testimony, is attached hereto as Appendix "A". 
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------- - ----- --------------
A I thought I was at one time, but apparently 
was not. 
Q Then what happened after you seen the 
individuals where you said? 
A After he informed me of the warrants that I 
had pending, he says, "You're free to go now," okay? And 
at that time this -- I didn't know her last name, LaDawn, 
I will refer to her as LaDawn. She was standing there 
next to me and David McCoy Crawled out of the police 
10 officer's car and came over and stood next to me. 
11 I kind of grabbed him by the elbow and pushe 
12 him to the side and said, "Hey, what is going on here? 
13 You indicated to me that was not Dennis Heaps' gun." 
14 MR. SOLTIS: Well, I will object to this, 
15 your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Be sustained. 
17 Q (By Mr. Valdez) Did you ask him any cuestions? • I 
18 
19 
A Yes, I asked him whose it was. 
MR. SOLTIS: Now, who is this conversation 
I 
I 
I 
20 with, Counsel? 
21 Q (By Mr. Valdez) Who was the conversation 
A l':i th Mr. David 1'icCoy. 
)4 ~hat did he reply? 
MP. SOLTIS: I will object, your Honor. 
Mr. McCoy --
2 THE COUPT: Be sustained as to -- who ~a, 
3 present at the time? Was McCoy there of the defendant 
4 whom? 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
(By Mr. Valdez) Kho was present at the 
Mr. Heaps was escorted to the Salt Lake 
County Jail. At the time this conversation was taking 
s place, as I indicated, I grabbed him by the elbow and 
9 pulled him to the side. I was talking to him, just me 
10 and this man. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Q. 
A. 
0 
A. 
Q. 
17 correct? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
(' 
A. 
Nobody else was present? 
Oh, no. 
Did you ask him whose gun it was? 
Yes, more or less indicated. Yes. 
MR. SOLTIS: Same objection, your Honor. 
(By Mr. Valdez) Well, he replied; is that 
Yes, he did. 
Did he say it was Mr. Heaps' gun? 
No, he did not. 
THE COl:RT: That will be stricken as a 
n violation of the hearsay rule. 
23 O (By Mr. Valdez) Did he make any indicatle' 
~ to vou as to whose oun it w2s, and that's a yes or no 
2:; answ·er. 
6 ' 
10 
11 
12 I 
13 
k Yes, he did. 
~ May I ask the follow-up question to that, 
your Honor, as to whether or not he indicated it was 
Mr. Heaps' gun? That's a yes or no question also. 
THE COUPT: You 
indirect examination what you 
Are you taking it as proof of 
was or what, sir? 
may not. You can't do by j 
can't do by direct examinati n. 
the fact of whose gun it 
I 
MR. VALDEZ: As an indication as to whose 
gun it was. I don't think this is going 
THE COURT: All right. As to whose gun it 
;:as. I will not accept it for whose oun it was as beino a , - I 
hearsay statement. If you have some other reason. I 
14 will not accept it for the truth or falsity of the contents 
15 thereof. Is this what the officer says? 
16 MP. VALDEZ: No. This is what Mr. McCoy 
17 said to this individual. 
11: THE COURT: All right. But as -- what was 
1? it you asked him? ~hat McCoy said to him? 
20 MP. VAT~DEZ: I asked him whether or not 
21 Mr. McCoy said it was ~r. Heaps' gun to him. 
22 THE COURT: ~Ell, I will not accept what 
23 Mr. McCoy said as to the truth of falsity of the contents 
thereof. If you ha\'e some other reason for the question, 
sir, you may proceed. 
I 
---~ 
---------------- -------
(By Mr. Valdez) Did he make any -- well, 
2 did he say to you why he said he told the police offi•.c• 
3 it was Mr. Heaps' gun? 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
your Honor. 
Yes, he did. 
MR. SOLTIS: Well, it's the same otject1on, 
THE COURT: No. He can answer yes or no, 
B whether he did or did not say so. \olha t is the purpose o'. 
9 this, as to 
10 MR. VALDEZ: Just the reasons as to why 
11 Mr. McCoy would have said that it was Dennis Heaps' gun. 
12 THE COURT: To the police officer in his 
13 presence? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. \'ALDEZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: \·Jell, I will sustain the obiec::: 
if that's the basis for the question. 
Q. (By Mr. Valdez) Did he make any indicatior. 
to you as to why he may have been scared? 
A. 
(). 
Yes, he did. 
What were those? 
MR. SOLTIS: Sarne objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: No. P..s to why he "'·as scared, 
can get his state of mind. It's not a relation to what 
somebody else did or didn't do. 
Q. (By ~·r. \'alrc2) h"Lat ciid he say about l " 
being scared? 
k He said that really the reason why he said 
what he said is because he was on probation and that he 
would be violated if caught in the act of, I don't know, 
5 I in -- I can say that. But the gun, because it was in his 
vehicle, he was scared he was going to get violated on his 
probation. 
Q And he told you that? 
k Yes, he did. 
10 Q. Did you have any further conversation with 
11 him after that? 
12 A. Other than telling him that it was much 
13 worse situation for Mr. Heaps because he was on parole, 
14 J didn't see where he would get off on the 
15 ' MR. SOLTIS: Well, objection to the 
16 materiality of that, your Honor. 
17 THE COGRT: Well, I can disregard it, 
18 Mr. Soltis. 
10 Q. (By Mr. \'aldez) will withdraw the 
2l' question on that. Have you ever had any further conversations 
21 with Mr. McCoy? 
22 A. No, not prior to this time. 
Q. Did you }cno"'· at that tim€ "'·hose gun that v.·cs? 
h. J\ot for sure. I v:a s indicated to whose it 
v.·a s. 
94 ! 
1·1J 
--------- -- --- - --- - .. - --------r 
I Q. 
Who made that indication to you? 
2 A. Mr. McCoy did when he said there was a 01-..:~ 
3 in his vehicle. 
4 
MR. SOLTIS: All right. Same objection, 
5 your Honor. 
6 
THE COURT: Ask another question, please. 
7 
Q. (By Mr. Valdez) Who was present at that 
8 time? 
9 
A. Me, Mr. Heaps, this girl, LaDawn, and the 
10 child, and Mr. McCoy. 
11 
Q. Okay. And whose gun did he say at that t0E 
12 it was? 
13 
MR. SOLTIS: Same objection, your Honor. 
14 
THE WITNESS: At that time he didn't say 
15 
whose gun it was. He said 
16 
MR. VALDEZ: Hold on until the judge rules. 
17 
THE COURT: Let's get another answer. He 
18 
didn't say whose --
19 
THE WITNESS: He didn't say whose gun it 
20 
was. He just indicated there was --
THE COCRT: Just a moment, sir. The ooest1·· 
22 
was did he say whose gun it was. And you have answered 
23 
that c;uestion. 
24 
Q (By Mr. \'aldez) Okay. Whose gun did he 
2S 
.say it '-'as? 
I I 
I 
I 
7 I 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1S 
IE 
17 I 
15 
19 
21 
22 
?3 
MR. SOLTIS: I object on hearsay, your Honor 
THE COURT: That ,,;ill be sustained. 
THE WITNESS: At what time? 
0 (By Mr. Valdez) Who was present when he tol 
you whose gun he thought it might be or gave an 
indication as to whose gun it was? 
A. The indication came when we were in the 
vehicle and we asked him why he was paranoid. Mr. Heaps 
asked him why he was paranoid of the police officer. 
That's the indication, because he says, "There's a gun in 
this truck." I don't know if he said, "I have a gun," or 
"There's a gun in this truck." 
0 Okay. But what I am asking you --
MR. SOLTIS: It has been asked and answered, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: It has. 
MR. VALDEZ: I don't know if he understood 
I 
the question, your Honor. Maybe if I ask it in a 
different way. 
THE COURT: 
I 
If he will answer the questions 1 
and stop volunteering and giving me -- if you listen to 
Mr. Valdez, he's offering very good, to-the-point, concise 
questions. Just answer his question and don't try to throw 
in all this other stuff that I am that you want to get 
1n here. Just answer Mr. Valdez' question simply and 
I 
__ _ll,_: 
'\ 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
.... 24 
25 
to the point. You may ask another guestion, sir. 
-: 
Q. (By Mr. Valdez) At any point in time was 
the actual ownership of the gun indicated to you? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Okay. And who was present at that time? 
A. Me and Mr. McCoy. 
Q And who made that indication? 
A. Mr. McCoy did. 
Q Was anybody else present? 
A. No. 
Q Did he give you a name as to who the gun 
belor:ged to? 
A. He didn't have to. It was just me and him 
standing there. 
Q. And was that Mr. Heaps? 
A. No. 
MR. SOLTIS: \·Jell, again, it's hearsay, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Be sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Valdez) i-;ere you you were never 
arrested on that particular night then; is that correct? 
P •. No, sir, I Wa8 not. 
Q. Police allowed you to go then? 
A . Yes, they did. 
Q. Who v..·a s arr€sted? 
I 
I 
I 
I, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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